expectancy as well as infant and child survival rates by comparing three scenarios. One is based on historical and future best guess estimated values given the existence of the epidemic. The second scenario assumes that the effect of the epidemic is much worse than 
Introduction
For the most part of the last century there has been cross-national convergence in life expectancy and infant and child survival rates. Life expectancy and survival rates have increased faster over time in countries with low survival rates and low life expectancy than in countries with high survival rates and high life expectancy. 1 Whilst not undisputed (see, for example, Hobijn and Franses (2001) and Mazumdar (2003) ), most analysts of convergence in the quality of life have hailed this development as a great achievement and success (Ram and Schultz (1979) ; Ram (1982 Ram ( , 1998 Ram ( , 2003 ; Ingram (1994) ; Easterlin (2000) ; Sab and Smith (2001) ; Neumayer (2003) , Kenny (2003) ; Becker, Philipson and Soares (2003) ).
What has been relatively neglected is that the convergence in life expectancy came to a halt at the end of the 20 th century, even, according to some estimations, turning into divergence. Wilson (2001) , Neumayer (2003) , Ram (2003) and Goesling and Firebaugh (2004) are exceptions to this neglect. Wilson (2001, p. 167) Neumayer (2003, p. 294 ) demonstrated the divergence and speculated that it might be explained by 'social upheaval in many countries of transition particularly in what used to be the former Soviet Union, together with the spread of AIDS and urban violence in many developing countries'. Goesling and Firebaugh (2004) also demonstrate divergence in the 1990s, attributing it largely to the effect of HIV/AIDS. Ram (2003) goes further and tests whether the results from convergence analysis change if the twelve countries most highly affected by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) are taken out of the sample. 2 He weighs observations by population size and examines convergence by looking at so-called β-convergence (regressing growth on initial values) and σ-convergence (the standard deviation and Theil's (1979) inequality index). He finds that the exclusion of these countries has a significant impact. First, whereas there is no evidence for β-convergence in life expectancy over the period 1980 to 2000 in the full sample, there is convergence in the restricted sample. Looked at the decade of the 1990s only, there is divergence (rather than convergence) in life expectancy in the full sample, but neither convergence nor divergence in the restricted sample. In terms of σ-convergence, the divergence in the 1990s is less pronounced in the restricted sample.
This article explores the impact of HIV/AIDS on convergence in fundamental aspects of the quality of life in much greater detail. First, in addition to life expectancy we also address infant and child survival, that is survival beyond the age of one and the age of five, respectively. Second, in addition to analyzing the past record, we also look at the predicted convergence trend in the future. Third, we tackle the impact of the epidemic more comprehensively in analyzing and comparing convergence trends in three scenarios: a 'Historical and Expected AIDS-scenario', a 'High AIDS-scenario' and a 'No AIDSscenario'. The first scenario is one of estimated historical and future best guess survival rates and life expectancies. The 'High AIDS-scenario' assumes that the epidemic has far worse consequences in high prevalence countries than expected. Whereas the 'No AIDS-scenario' is based on survival rates and life expectancies taking out the estimated best guess mortality caused by the epidemic. We will show that HIV/AIDS has caused divergence in life expectancies that will stay with us for another decade or so in the 'Historical and Expected AIDS-scenario' and until the end of our period of analysis (2050) in the 'High AIDSscenario'. The epidemic has not led to divergence in infant or child survival rates and will not do so in the future in any of the scenarios, but it has slightly slowed down convergence in these indicators of the quality of life.
This article is structured as follows. The next section provides background information on the impact that HIV/AIDS has had on mortality in the most severely affected countries. Within this region, the seven most affected countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (UNPD 2003) . See Philipson and Posner (1995) and Caldwell (2000) for a discussion of the many reasons why Sub-Saharan Africa is so particularly hard hit by the epidemic.
Whilst most countries severely affected by the epidemic seem to have reached the peak of HIV incidence, prevalence is estimated to peak only in this decade or the next due to the fact that many HIV-infected persons survive for a number of years before eventually dying from AIDS (UNPD 2003, We now want to examine the impact that the losses in life expectancy and the increase in infant and child mortality caused by HIV/AIDS have on global convergence in these fundamental aspects of the quality of life.
Three AIDS-scenarios
We will analyze trends in convergence in life expectancy and survival rates according to three different scenarios. The first scenario, the 'Historical and Expected AIDS-scenario' is based on estimates of best guess observed past and current values of survival rates and life expectancies as well as their extrapolations into the future via best guess estimates.
The second scenario, the 'High AIDS-scenario', takes account of the fact that the AIDS-epidemic might turn out to have much worse effects than expected. There are many possible ways such a 'High AIDS-scenario' could be modeled. One possibility is that countries with currently low HIV/AIDS prevalence could turn into countries with high prevalence. There is great uncertainty about possible increases in infection rates outside the currently severely affected countries, the vast majority of which are located in Sub-Saharan 6 Africa. Eberstadt (2002) , for example, fears that we might see a tremendous increase in HIV/AIDS in Russia, China, India and other Asian countries. However, this is very speculative. Instead, we will simply assume here that the list of countries with high prevalence remains the same, but that the effects on life expectancies and survival rates are worse than expected and increasingly so the further in the future the best guess estimate lies.
Specifically, we will assume that life expectancies in high prevalence countries in 2005 countries, the annual number of newly infected persons is estimated for past years. As a second step, the annual probability of acquiring HIV among persons aged 15 or over is estimated. This annual probability is then projected into the future (third step) in order to estimate the number of adults living with HIV/AIDS and dying of AIDS in the future (fourth step). These calculations are based on follow-up studies of HIV infected persons. By modeling the fertility of HIV-positive mothers and by assuming a fixed rate of transmission from mother to child together with assumptions about the probability of dying from AIDS, the number of deaths of infants and children under the age of five can be calculated (fifth step). Once the number of adult, infant and child mortality from AIDS has been estimated, 
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We take historical data on life expectancy from the UNPD and data on mortality of children under the age of five from the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF). The UNDP also provides best guess estimations into the future until 2050. It should be noted that both historical data as well as, even more so, the best guess future estimations are potentially subject to measurement error and have to be treated with some caution. The data are Results for infant mortality are very similar to results for the under-5 mortality, such that we report results only for the latter. The mortality rates were converted into survival rates by subtracting them from 1000.
Tools of convergence analysis
One can define convergence as follows: Countries converge in a variable of interest if the dispersion of the variable is shrinking over time. As our tools of convergence analysis we test for what is commonly known as β-convergence and σ-convergence. β-convergence implies regressing the growth rate in life expectancy or survival rates on the initial level. This is typically done in a log-transformed model:
ln(x it /x i0 ) = α + β·ln(x i0 ) + e i where i stands for each country and t is a count of years after base year zero. If the estimated β-coefficient is negative and statistically significant, then we infer that countries have converged on the dependent variable. A statistically significant positive coefficient sign leads us to conclude that countries have diverged instead. If the coefficient is statistically insignificant, whether positive or not, we cannot conclude either way and say that we observe neither convergence nor divergence.
By analyzing β-convergence in a log-transformed model, one implicitly assumes that the distance of points within the distribution of the variable of interest is measured in percentage terms. This might be a plausible way of measuring distance, but it can also overstate convergence since the same absolute amount of change in a variable translates into a smaller change in the log of that variable at higher values. Frontrunners will find it increasingly difficult to run ever further away if the variable of interest is analyzed in its logged form. An alternative is therefore to analyze convergence of a variable without logtransformation, that is, in level form. To save space and because the log-model is so common in β-convergence analysis, we will not regress growth rates on levels, but we will examine the level form of the life expectancy and survival rate variables in the σ-convergence analysis.
σ-convergence analysis tests whether the spread of the distribution of a variable shrinks over time. The two concepts of convergence are similar, but not identical. β-convergence analysis examines whether past low performers fare better than past high performers and therefore analyzes intra-distributional movement. As such it is a necessary condition for σ-convergence since the spread of the distribution could not shrink if the low performers did not catch up. It is not a sufficient condition, however, since theoretically the once poor performers could overtake the once strong performers to an extent that the spread of the distribution increases, which would result in β-convergence with simultaneous σ-divergence (Sala-i-Martin 1996) . Further below we will see that for our variables of interest the analyses of β-convergence and σ-convergence produce very similar results. A further question is whether observations should be weighted or not. In the nonweighted case, Luxembourg counts the same as, say, China even though the latter has a much, much larger population size. To see whether weighting has any influence on our results, we perform all convergence analyses twice, namely once without and once with weighting by population size. Table 2 Let us now turn to examining convergence in child survival rates. As mentioned above, the analysis of convergence in infant survival rates leads to very similar results. Table 3 reports results for the β-convergence analysis. Table 4 about here >
Results

Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancies and, if less pronounced, on infant and child survival in the most affected countries is simply horrendous. The tragedy in terms of loss of 14 human health and life is difficult to do justice to in the words we use to describe the situation.
In Botswana and Zimbabwe, for example, the current life expectancy at birth is already below 40 years and is expected to fall to 31.6 and 33 years, respectively, by 2010-15. These are extremely low values and put these two and other most severely affected countries back to levels of life expectancy from before the Second World War or even the beginning of the 20 th century. Botswana, which had one of the lowest child mortality rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, saw its success erode by the epidemic as mortality rates rose from 63 deaths in 1990-1995 to an estimated 104 deaths per 1000 births today (UNPD 2003, p. 10) .
HIV/AIDS is not the only cause of a mortality crisis. Indeed, Eastern European countries and in particular those which belonged to the former Soviet Union experienced increased mortality during the economic and social crisis following the collapse of communism. External and violent causes of death together with diseases of the circulatory system account for the bulk of the mortality increase (Gavrilova et al. 2000) . This comes on top of a trend already existent since the mid-1960s towards premature male mortality in many Eastern European countries (Watson 1995) . However, in comparison to HIV/AIDS, the impact on life expectancy at birth has been relatively modest. Even in Russia, one of the most severely affected countries, average life expectancy fell only slightly from 69.5 years to 66.1 years in the 1990s. True, the average hides the fact that the impact is much stronger on males than on females and it is valid to speak of 'The Mortality Crisis in Transitional Economies' (Cornia and Paniccia 2000) . But these tragic losses in life expectancy are simply dwarfed in terms of size by the much larger losses in life expectancy caused by HIV/AIDS in the severely affected countries. It is not the mortality crisis in the former Soviet Union that is 'without parallel in modern history', as Chen, Wittgenstein and McKeon (1996, p. 520) suggest, but the HIV/AIDS mortality crisis. Similarly, whilst mortality from violent crime is rising in many, particularly developing, countries, the effect on life expectancy of the general population rather than that of specific groups such as young black males living in ghettos, slums or favelas is generally negligible. For example, homicide contributes only about 0.6 years or 9.7 per cent to the life expectancy difference of 6 years between whites and blacks in the United States (Potter 2001) .
This article has demonstrated that the losses of life expectancy due to HIV/AIDS have been the major cause of the recent lack of cross-national convergence and perhaps even divergence. The epidemic has not stalled convergence in infant and child survival rates, but it has slowed down the process of convergence. That the epidemic has stalled cross-national convergence in life expectancy is rendered worse by the fact that convergence in fundamental aspects of the quality of life was cause for consolation to development scholars in the face of the well-established and disappointing lack of convergence or even divergence in average per capita income levels (Pritchett 1996 (Pritchett , 1997 Quah 1996 Quah , 1997 . The epidemic has taken away this consolation, at least for the time being. Worse still, it is likely to exacerbate existing divergence in per capita income levels. Early estimates predicted negligible impacts of the epidemic on per capita incomes in the most severely affected countries due to lower population growth compensating for the fall in economic output. However, newer estimates taking into account the increased speed and scale of the epidemic and the loss in human and social capital in addition to the loss in physical capital suggest a much larger impact (Bonnel 2000; Gaffeo 2003 ). This will lead to further divergence in per capita income levels. Dyson Another reason causing concern about the impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy at birth in particular is that life expectancy might be inter-linked with other measures of the quality of life. Kenny (2003, p. 20) suggests that 'life expectancy is the best single proxy' for a broad 'basket' of quality of life indicators. We know precious little about the inter-linkages among different aspects of the quality of life, but if they do exist then the lack of convergence in life expectancy might cause lack of convergence in other aspects of the quality of life, possibly with a delay.
The fundamental reason why HIV/AIDS not only causes a mortality crisis in many countries, but also global divergence or a slow-down in convergence is due to two factors.
First, the highest prevalence rates are found in countries faced with rampant poverty, low income levels and deficient health care systems. This implies higher mortality than if economically and socially developed countries experienced similar prevalence rates. Second, the epidemic is concentrated in countries that are low performers in life expectancy and infant and child survival rates. It thus prevents them from catching up with the high performers, at least from catching up as fast as they would otherwise do. Once mortality due to HIV/AIDS is corrected for, the long-running trends toward convergence in these fundamental aspects of the quality of life are fully confirmed. But, of course, as a matter of fact HIV/AIDS exists and is here to stay with us.
Fortunately, current projections imply that the lack of convergence or perhaps even divergence in life expectancy is only a temporary phenomenon as the results from our 'Historical and Expected AIDS-scenario' suggest. Riley (2001) shows that such temporal reverses have occurred in the past as well, for example, when the rapid increase in urbanization exceeded the infrastructure of cities to cope with urban population growth. If, on the other hand, the epidemic has a much worse impact on life expectancies and child survival rates than expected, then it could take many decades still until convergence in life expectancy is achieved again. Our 'High AIDS-scenario', which by necessity cannot be more than a crude modeling of a far more severe epidemic than expected, suggests that given our assumptions there would be divergence in life expectancies over the course of the next 45 years. With respect to infant and child survival rates, the converging trend is so strong, however, that even in this scenario it does not come to a halt.
Which scenario is more likely to happen in the future is very difficult to say. Bongaarts (1996) demonstrates the uncertainty involved in predicting the future course of the epidemic over as little as one decade. Future trends in prevention efforts, in access to antiretroviral treatment and in access to medical and care infrastructure are difficult to predict and will have important effects on the future trend in life expectancies and infant and child survival rates. One would hope that better and more equal access to medical care and treatment and hygienic conditions, more successful preventive measures and perhaps even the discovery of a vaccine will mitigate the loss in human life and the pain and suffering caused by HIV/AIDS, thus bringing the world back on the road towards convergence in these fundamental aspects of the quality of life quicker than predicted by the 'Historical and Expected AIDS-scenario'.
NOTES
1 Although not the focus of this article, the same is true for many other aspects of the quality of life, for example, convergence in other health and educational indicators and in access to radio and television (Sab and Smith 2001; Neumayer 2003; Kenny 2003 and Markov transition analysis (see Neumayer 2003) . However, they are only really needed in very special cases, for example, if we are worried that countries permanently criss-cross from the upper to the lower bounds of a σ-converging distribution (Quah 1996) and this is not the case here.
6 Note that because the UN provides data in five-year averages, the regressions report results on the growth rate between 1955-60 and 1960-65 against the life expectancy in 1955-60 and so on. Results from OLS regression of growth rate in child survival rates on initial period logged levels. 
